This paper identifies a fundamental economic welfare tradeoff between two-sided open platforms and two-sided proprietary (closed) platforms connecting consumers and producers. Proprietary platforms create two-sided deadweight losses through monopoly pricing but at the same time, precisely because they set prices in order to maximize profits, they partially internalize two-sided positive indirect network effects and direct competitive effects on the producer side. We show that this can sometimes make proprietary platforms more socially desirable than open platforms, which runs against the common intuition that open platforms are more efficient. By the same token, inter-platform competition may also turn out to be socially undesirable because it may prevent platforms from sufficiently internalizing indirect externalities and direct intra-platform competitive effects.
Introduction
An increasing number of industries in today's economy are organized around two-sided platforms, which enable consumers to purchase, access and use a variety of products supplied by independent producers: software systems, Internet portals, mobile networks, shopping centers, etc. Policy makers have recently started to devote considerable attention to some of these markets: in particular, the rising popularity of the open source software movement has led many governments around the world to enact policies promoting open source software systems at the expense of proprietary systems 1 . Oftentimes, these policies seem to In this context, the key contribution of our paper is to formally reveal a fundamental welfare tradeoff between two-sided proprietary (i.e. profit-maximizing) platforms and twosided open platforms, which allow "free entry" on both sides of the market. Using the model of two-sided platforms connecting buyers and suppliers of many varied products first introduced by Hagiu (2004a) , we show that on the one hand, a profit-maximizing platform creates two-sided deadweight losses through monopoly pricing, but on the other hand, precisely because it sets prices in order to maximize profits, it internalizes at least partially the positive indirect network externalities between consumers and product suppliers and the direct competitive effects between producers. By contrast, an open platform internalizes 1 See Hahn et al. (2002) . 2 See for instance Armstrong (2005) , Rochet and Tirole (2003) , Hagiu (2004b) . 2 neither of these two effects since it essentially sets prices equal to marginal costs (zero) on both sides. Therefore it is by no means obvious which type of platform will create higher product variety, consumer adoption and total social welfare. We also show that the same tradeoff arises when comparing a situation with competing platforms and one with a single monopoly platform: for a certain range of parameters, the latter generates higher product variety and social welfare. This suggests that there is a sense in which platform competition is undesirable because it prevents platforms from sufficiently internalizing indirect network effects and therefore from inducing the appropriate levels of product variety.
This paper is also a generalization of the earlier economics literature on product variety, free entry and social efficiency, in particular the seminal contribution of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) . They study the inefficiencies associated with free-entry in product markets and show that the sign of the inefficiency (i.e. whether there is excessive or insufficient entry) depends on the interplay between the competitive (business-stealing) effect and the product-diversity effect. Our analysis can be viewed as an extension of theirs in two important dimensions. First, Mankiw and Whinston's model is "one-sided" in the sense that the number of consumers participating in the market is fixed and only the number of producers is variable. This allows them to focus exclusively on direct (negative) competitive effects on the producer side and abstract from the positive indirect network effects between the consumer side and the producer side, which are central to our paper. Thus, our two-sided open platforms are similar but more general than the free-entry regimes studied by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) , Kiyono and Suzumura (1987) , Spence (1976) , Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Salop (1979) because consumer participation in the market is endogenous in our framework. Second and most important, our two-sided proprietary platforms controlling market access through prices charged to both consumers and product suppliers constitute a novel form of market organization, which has not been analyzed by 3 the literature on product variety.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on indirect network effects, especially Church and Gandal (1992) and Church Gandal and Krause (2002) . Both papers study twosided technology (or platform) adoption, however in both models, the platform is assumed to be entirely passive, i.e. there is no strategic pricing on either side of the market. This 
Modelling framework
The modeling framework is derived from that developed in Hagiu (2004a) . We are interested in two-sided platforms whose value to consumers (users) is increasing in the number of developers 3 they support and whose value to developers is increasing in the number of 3 Developers are third-party product suppliers: developers of software applications or games, content providers, etc. For simplicity and ease of interpretation throughout the paper we will use the blanket term "developers" instead of third-party producers and "applications" in order to refer to their products. 4 users who adopt them. The platform controls the extent of adoption on both sides of the market through prices.
Net surplus for a user indexed by θ from joining a platform which charges her P U 4 and is supported by n applications is:
where u (n) is the surplus obtained from the n applications, net of the prices charged by application developers and the parameter θ is the user's intrinsic "distance" in preference space to the system comprised by the platform and the applications 5 . It is distributed over a support [θ L , θ H ] (we allow θ H to be infinite). The number of users "closer" than θ such that F (θ L ) = 0. We denote by ε F the elasticity of F , which is to be interpreted as the "elasticity" of user demand for the platform:
Similarly, net profits for a developer indexed by φ from supporting a platform which charges P D and is adopted by all users with θ ≤ θ m are 6 : Hagiu (2004b) studies the pricing aspect of the problem into detail. Here we are concerned with social efficiency, therefore we choose the simplest possible pricing game which allows us to derive the main insights. 5 For example, it can be interpreted as the difference between the fixed (sunk) cost of learning how to use the system and the standalone value of the platform (in case it comes bundled with some applications). 6 Indeed, given the structure of user preferences assumed above, if user θ adopts the platform given n and P U then all users θ 0 ≤ θ will also adopt.
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where π (n) is the profit per platform user net of variable costs and the parameter φ is the fixed cost of writing an application, distributed on [0, φ H ] (we allow φ H to be infinite).
The number of developers with fixed costs less than or equal to φ is H (φ), where H is a differentiable and strictly increasing function with continuously differentiable derivative h,
and such that H (0) = 0. The elasticity of developer demand for the platform is:
As suggested by this formulation we will ignore integer constraints and treat n as a continuous variable throughout the paper. The reason is that in the markets we have in mind there are hundreds or even thousands of applications: each individual developer is then "very small" and ignores the influence of his decision on platform adoption by users and other developers. Continuity also renders the analysis very convenient by allowing us to use demand elasticities.
Let:
denote the gross surplus created by n applications for each platform user.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 u (n) is strictly increasing, π (n) is strictly decreasing and V (n) is strictly increasing and concave.
This assumption is quite reasonable: it simply says that net user surplus u (n) is increasing in the number of applications used, that each developer's profits per user are decreasing in n (crowding effect) and that the gross user surplus created by n applications is increasing at a decreasing rate (the 100th application is less valuable than the 10th).
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Let us denote by ε V the elasticity of V :
The elasticity ε V measures the intensity of users' preference for variety. The higher ε V , the less concave V (.) and therefore the higher the marginal contribution of an additional application to gross surplus per platform user.
Also, it will prove useful to define: In order to illustrate how the reduced forms u (n), π (n) and V (n) are obtained, we provide two specific examples, both of which satisfy assumption 1 and which we will use throughout the paper.
Example 1 Suppose users' gross utility has the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz form G (
where q i is the "quantity" of application i consumed, v (0) = 0, v 0 (.) > 0 and v 00 (.) < 0 and G 0 (.) > 0, G 00 (.) < 0.
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User maximization implies that the quantity q k demanded by each platform user 7 from developer k charging p k satisfies:
as given when setting his price.
Consequently, the stage 3 pricing equilibrium among developers is symmetric and defined by:
Letting v (q) = q σ and G (z) = z α σ , with 0 < α < σ < 1, we obtain p = c σ and:
Example 2 Suppose users have unitary demand for applications (i.e. buy either 0 or one unit of each application) and gross benefits from using n applications are V (n) with V 0 (.) > 0, V 00 (.) < 0. In this case the stage 3 price equilibrium is: p n = V 0 (n) leading 7 This is because all users "agree" on the incremental benefits offered by applications.
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to 8 :
Letting V (n) = An β , with 0 < β < 1, we obtain 9 :
Let us now clearly specify the timing of the pricing game we consider throughout the paper. There are 3 stages:
• Stage 1) The platform sets prices P U and P D for consumers and developers simultaneously
• Stage 2) Users and developers make their adoption decision simultaneously
• Stage 3) Developers having adopted the platform set prices for consumers and those consumers who have adopted the platform in the second stage decide which applications to buy.
The slightly odd-sounding assumption that users decide whether or not to buy the platform before developers set their prices is made in order to simplify the analysis of the two-sided pricing game. Given that developers are atomistic in our model, it is entirely harmless: developers ignore the effect of their pricing decision on total consumer demand for the platform anyway. 8 Here we assume developers have 0 marginal costs: many of the real-life platforms we have in mind support digital applications whose marginal costs are virtually 0. In example 1 marginal costs are necessarily positive in order to keep prices and profits finite. 9 This example is used by Church Gandal and Krause (2002).
The optimization problem for a two-sided proprietary platform
Given the platform's prices P U and P D , it is indeed an (interior) equilibrium for n developers and F (θ m ) users to adopt the platform in stage 2 only if the following two conditions hold:
The first condition says that in equilibrium all profit opportunities are exhausted for developers (assuming the supply of developers is large enough) and the second condition says that the marginal user θ m must be indifferent between adopting and not adopting the platform.
Equation ( Plugging (2.2) into (2.1), we obtain n as an implicit function of the platform's prices
This expression makes clear that on the developer side of the market there are both positive indirect network effects contained in the term F ¡ u (n) − P U ¢ and negative direct or competitive effects contained in the term π (n).
Throughout the paper we normalize for simplicity and without any loss of substance the platform's marginal costs on both sides to 0. The expression of platform profits is then:
Using (2.1) and (2.2) we obtain:
which depends only on (θ m , n). Therefore, rather than maximizing platform profits over
we will do so directly over (θ m , n) 10 .
The first-order conditions determining the optimal ¡ θ m p , n p ¢ are:
Given the profit-maximizing ¡ n p , θ m p ¢ , the corresponding profit maximizing prices
¢ are then uniquely determined by (2.1) and (2.2).
The optimization problem for the social planner
A benevolent social planner maximizes total welfare, which in our framework is the difference between total surplus from indirect network effects and the costs of entry on the two sides of the market. Its expression when n developers and all θ ≤ θ m users are allowed in the market is then:
which the social planner maximizes over (θ m , n). This leads to the following first-order conditions:
which determine the socially optimal levels of entry on both sides (θ m so , n so ).
Open platform or two-sided free entry
In our framework, an open platform is characterized simply by free-entry of both users 
where π D m (n) are net profits of the marginal developer when n developers have entered.
Before proceeding, there are a few issues we need to address in order to be completely rigorous. First, we sidestep the problem of multiple solutions inherent in contexts with 12 indirect network effects by assuming 11 : Second, at a minimum we should also make sure that given
a stable market configuration and similarly, given zero prices on both sides (
¢ also arises as a stable market configuration. Graphically, stability of con-
Assumption 3 The market configurations
The following lemma, proven in the appendix, provides a useful example of functional forms, which satisfy assumptions 2 and 3.
Lemma 0 Assume F , H and V are defined on [0, +∞] and have constant elasticities,
1−σα in example 1 and ε V = β, λ = 1 in example 2. Then assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied if:
The insights provided by the discussion that follows is unaffected by this assumption and the formal analysis is greatly simplified. 12 See Hagiu (2004b) for a graphic representation and a dynamic justification.
Third and last, for as illustrated in figure 2.1 13 .
This is a well-known feature in markets with indirect network effects 14 . Thus, we also make the following assumption.
Assumption 4
If there are multiple stable market configurations, solutions to (2.1) Church and Gandal (1992) . desired by the platform, then the latter can "adjust" coordination either by providing some of its own applications or by restricting entry on both sides.
Proprietary platforms, open platforms, product diversity and social efficiency
Having set up the equations determining the levels of user adoption and developer entry under a two-sided proprietary platform, a social planner and a two-sided open platform, we can now turn to comparing them, as well as the total levels of social welfare the platforms induce.
Monopoly proprietary platform vs. monopoly open platform
Although our representation of open platforms as allowing free entry on both sides of the market may be an overly simplified conceptualization of, say, the open source software form of market organization 15 , it is sufficient for revealing a fundamental welfare tradeoff relative to proprietary platforms. An open platform does not create two-sided deadweight losses due to monopoly pricing but at the same time leaves uninternalized the positive indirect network effects between users and developers, whereas a proprietary platform has an incentive to internalize them precisely because it sets its prices in order to maximize profits.
Note that in a one-sided market the welfare comparison would be trivial: a firm pricing at marginal cost always entails higher output and higher social welfare than a profitmaximizing monopolist who cannot price-discriminate. By contrast, in a two-sided context, things are more complex: as we show below, a proprietary platform may in fact induce more developer entry (i.e. product variety), user adoption and higher total social welfare than an open platform and it may even result in socially excessive product variety (and user adoption).
To understand precisely where the tradeoffs come from, it is useful to look at the economic mechanisms which drive entry on each side of the market. Consider first the developer side. The derivative of total social welfare with respect to n is: 
Just like in Mankiw and Whinston (1986) the first term represents the business stealing effect and is negative as long as Consider now the derivative of a proprietary platform's profits with respect to n:
Comparing (3.2) with (3.1), the proprietary platform introduces no inefficiency through the business stealing and the product diversity effects. This is due to the fact that in our model both users and developers are differentiated only horizontally, so that the platform can fully internalize developer revenues nπ (n) and user gross surplus V (n) − nπ (n) 16 .
What does induce a bias however is the proprietary platform's inability to perfectly price discriminate among developers: it consequently discounts the total social value created by an additional developer by nH −10 (n), the revenues lost on existing developers by reducing the price P D in order to accomodate the additional developer. Since this bias is negative, the proprietary platform tends to induce too little entry on the developer side, keeping everything else constant.
Turning now to the user side of the market, first order condition 2.5 with respect to θ for the proprietary platform is:
Comparing (2.8) to (2.11) , the open platform tends to induce too little user adoption all other things equal, because each developer who enters does not take into account the effect of his price on total user demand for the platform. Comparing (3.3) to (2.8), the proprietary platform also tends to induce too little user entry: it perceives the benefits of an additional user as the difference between the extra revenues
which are exactly equal to the total social value created by the additional user 17 , and
the revenues lost on existing users by reducing the price P U p in order to accomodate the additional user.
Comparing (2.11) and (3.3), it is not possible to say in general which of the open platform or the proprietary platform restricts user adoption more. It depends on the sign of P U p : all other things equal, the proprietary platform induces less restriction of user entry if and only if it subsidizes users, i.e. sets P U p < 0. This illustrates the fact that, by being able to balance the interests of the two sides through its pricing structure, a proprietary platform may come closer to the socially optimal level of adoption than a platform simply pricing at marginal cost on both sides.
Thus, given that a proprietary platform induces a bias towards socially insufficient entry on both sides of the market, the combination of the two leads unambiguously to insufficient product diversity and user adoption relative to the socially optimal levels. This of course is not a robust conclusion: it is due to our assumption of horizontal differentiation on both sides. Below we show that introducing vertical developer differentiation is sufficient for 17 Once again, this is because users are differentiated only horizontally.
18 overturning this result.
However, even in this simple horizontal differentiation framework, the proprietary platforms may turn out to induce higher levels of product variety and total social welfare. To see this more clearly, we can combine the first-order conditions above in order to obtain:
• the level of product variety n p induced by a proprietary platform solves:
• the level of product variety n fe induced by an open platform solves:
• the level of product variety n so chosen by the social planner solves:
Under sufficient regularity conditions (cf. Assumption 2 and Lemma 0), n p , n fe , n so are well-defined, i.e. (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) each have a unique positive solution. Then, since, ε F 1+ε F < 1 and H −10 (n) > 0, we have n p < n so . However, comparing (3.4) and (3.5), it is not possible to say in general whether n p ≷ n fe . Figure (??) illustrates (3.4) , (3.5) and (3.6): in graph a) the positive indirect network effects are outweighed by the negative direct business-stealing effects on the developer side so that the left-hand sides of (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) are decreasing in n, whereas graph b) depicts the case in which the positive indirect effects are stronger.
The following proposition provides a rigorous illustration of all the previous considera- 
and competition among developers is either as in example 1, with ε V = ii) Suppose in addition that ε F = 1 and that all developers have the same fixed cost φ (i.e. ε H = +∞, C = φ) and compete as in example 1. Then:
• n p > n fe if and only if
• Total social welfare can be higher with either type of platform: Proof See appendix.¥
The most substantial part of proposition 4 is part ii): it exhibits specific cases in which a proprietary platform dominates an open platform both in terms of product variety and total social welfare.
Developer vertical differentiation and socially excessive product variety
Despite its tractability, one shortcoming of the two-sided horizontal differentiation model we have used up to now is that it cannot generate cases in which proprietary platforms induce socially excessive levels of product variety 18 , as was made clear in the discussion above. This is because when the two sides of the market are differentiated only horizontally, a two-sided platform fully internalizes the indirect network effects between users and developers, as well as the direct competitive effects between developers. The only distortions which arise are the deadweight losses due to monopoly pricing on both sides of the market and they lead to insufficient entry of both users and developers.
In this subsection we wish to make clear that this feature cannot be robust to more general formulations of user and developer demand and that everything hinges crucially on the extent to which a platform internalizes indirect network effects and business-stealing effects. Even though a two-sided platform extracts only a part of total user and developer surplus, there is no reason why the marginal contribution of an additional developer to platform profits should always be lower than the marginal contribution of that developer to total social surplus so that the platform necessarily restricts entry too much relative to the social optimum. In particular, if developers are sufficiently vertically differentiated by the benefits they offer users (as opposed to being simply heterogeneous in their fixed costs) and if the platform is unable to perfectly price discriminate, then it might overestimate the value of the positive indirect network effects relative to the value of negative direct competitive effects and therefore induce socially excessive entry.
To formalize this insight, we modify our model by assuming that all developers have the same fixed cost φ > 0 and that they are exogenously differentiated by the quality q of their applications. The quality q is the probability that a given user is interested in a particular application (demand for each application is unitary) and is distributed over
, such that the number of developers with quality lower than q 18 By contrast, it is easy to construct cases in which the level of product variety generated by an open platform is socially excessive: it suffices to assume inelastic user demand and use our example 1 with the functional forms provided in section 4 of Mankiw and Whinston (1986):
is H (q), where H is an increasing function with continuous derivative h and satisifying H (q L ) = 0 and H (q H ) < +∞.
Although developers are vertically differentiated, we still assume for simplicity that the platform is restricted to charging only fixed access fees on both sides 19 . Given platform prices ¡ P U , P D ¢ and user demand F (θ m ), only high-quality developers enter, i.e.
those with q ≥ q m , where q m is the quality of the marginal developer. Each user buys R q H q m qh (q) dq applications so that the equilibrium price of applications is V 0
y straightforward analogy with example 1 above. q m is then defined by:
The marginal user θ m is then given by:
where:
is the number of applications bought by each platform user. Platform profits are:
is the difference between total developer revenues and the portion thereof which is extracted by the platform (per user). In other words, it is the part of developer gross surplus uninternalized by the platform. Note that when all developers have the same quality, E (q m ) = 0, which brings us back to the horizontal differentiation case, in which the twosided platform fully internalizes both developer revenues and user surplus.
Assuming the appropriate second order and stability conditions hold, the profit-maximizing marginal product quality q m p and user θ m p are the solutions to the first-order conditions:
Social welfare on the other hand has the following expression:
so that the socially optimal marginal product quality q m so and marginal user θ m so are the solutions to:
Comparing (3.9) and (3.10) to (3.7) and (3.8), it is no longer obvious whether the twosided proprietary platform will induce too little (q m p > q m so ) or too much (q m p < q m so ) variety (and user adoption). Indeed, while the monopoly pricing distortion on the user side still tends to render user adoption sub-optimal 20 , on the developer side it all depends on the sign of E 0 (q m ). Specifically, if E 0 (q m ) > 0, then the left hand side of (3.8) is lower than the left-hand side of (3.10) and consequently, since both expressions are decreasing in q m (required by our assumption that the maximization problems are well-defined), it might turn out that q m p < q m so . In this case there is an excessive variety bias on the developer side, which may exceed the insufficient user adoption bias. The following proposition provides and example in which this happens:
Proposition 5 Assume there is a mass B of identical users (i.e. user demand for the platform is inelastic),
Then Π P (q m ) and W (q m ) are concave and the proprietary platform induces socially excessive product diversity, i.e. q m p < q m so or
Proof In the appendix.¥
Monopoly platform vs. competing platforms
The economic efficiency tradeoff coined above between internalizing two-sided indirect network effects and creating two-sided deadweight loss also has interesting implications regarding the desirability of competition between two-sided platforms. In a static one-sided context, with no fixed set-up costs and no innovation, more competition always increases social welfare as it helps reduce the deadweight losses due to pricing by firms with market power. In a two-sided context however, the countervailing force is that platform competition limits the ability of individual platforms to extract surplus from both sides of the market and therefore may generate less product variety and user adoption than those arising under a monopoly platform regime (all other things equal). This negative effect might well outweigh the positive effect of competition (reduction of deadweight loss).
To illustrate this mechanism, consider the following straightforward extension of our model to allow for platform competition (cf . Hagiu (2004b) ). The user horizontal differentiation parameter θ is now assumed to be uniformly distributed on a Hotelling segment [0, 1]; unit transportation costs are t and there is one platform situated at each of the two extremities. Thus, the utility of a user located at θ ∈ [0, 1] from adopting platform 1 is
where u 0 is the standalone value of each platform for users. In all that follows we assume u 0 is large enough so that the user market is always entirely covered. For i = 1, 2, n i denotes the number of developers supporting platform i. Then, denoting by D U i total user demand for platform i, we have D U 1 + D U 2 = 1 and:
where u i = u 0 + u (n i ) − P U i is the utility gross of transportation costs offered by platform i to its users.
Meanwhile we assume there is no differentiation between platforms from the developers' perspective, i.e. a developer with fixed development cost φ makes profits π (n i )
multihoming 21 . Thus, for each developer, the decision to adopt platform 1 is independent 21 We also implicitly assume the development cost is platform-independent and there are no economies of of his decision to adopt platform 2, given D U 1 and D U 2 22 , so that developer demand n i for platform i ∈ {1, 2} is implicitly defined by:
The assumption that platforms are differentiated from the point of view of users but are perfect substitutes for developers simplifies the analysis and is also quite realistic in most cases. Indeed, at equal platform quality, developers care only about the respective installed bases of users and, compared to the latter, they are relatively less likely to have intrinsic preferences for one platform over the other (i.e. being die-hard MacIntosh or Nintendo fans for example).
Although in principle both users and developers are allowed to multihome, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which each platform attracts half the users exclusively, whereas all developers who enter multihome. If the user differentiation parameter t is large enough, this is the only symmetric equilibrium. Platform 1's profits are then:
In order to find the symmetric equilibrium without explicitly deriving the two-dimensional best-response functions, we use a "trick" developed by Choi (2004) . In the symmetric equi-"platform scale", i.e. the cost of development for an additional platform does not depend on having or not developed for another platform. 22 This is because developers are atomistic, so that each individual developer does not take into account the effect of his adoption decision on D librium, u 1 = u 2 = u and
Consider then varying P D 1 while maintaining u (n 1 ) − P U 1 fixed equal to u:
Meanwhile, (3.12) defines a 1-to-1 relationship between n 1 and P D 1 23 :
so that we can optimize directly over n 1 . We obtain that the number n c of developers who enter (and multihome) in the symmetric equilibrium with platform competition is defined by 24 :
Since we are only concerned with social welfare and prices are simple transfers, we need not worry here about determining the actual equilibrium prices charged by the platforms on the two sides of the market (see Hagiu (2004b) for the complete derivation of the pricing structure): n c is sufficient for our purposes.
Let us now turn to the case of a monopoly platform situated at one extremity of the Hotelling segment and assume that u 0 is high enough so that the platform covers the entire market for users. It does so by charging P U = u 0 + u (n) − t. Developer demand n is given by:
23 This is because π is strictly decreasing and H −1 strictly increasing. 24 If the right-hand side of (3.13) is increasing then nc is unique. This is the case when H has constant elasticity.
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Therefore platform profits are:
so that the level of product diversity n p chosen by the monopoly platform is defined by:
Comparing (3.14) and (3.13), it is clear that the monopoly platform induces more product diversity than the competing platforms:
The social welfare tradeoff is the following. With a monopoly platform situated at one extremity (say 0) of the Hotelling segment, there is less platform diversity so that users situated further than x = 1 2 incur additional transportation costs ( t 2 overall). On the other hand however, the monopoly platform offers more developer product diversity to its users than any of the two competing platforms because it is able to internalize a larger share of user benefits. Additionaly, there is no duplication of fixed costs for the developers who enter, since they only support one platform rather than two.
Formally, the social welfare gain from having one platform rather than two is:
The following proposition establishes rigorously that this expression can be either positive or negative depending on parameter values.
Proposition 6 Assume u 0 is high enough so that both the competing platforms and a single monopoly platform cover the user market entirely in equilibrium, that all developers have the same fixed development cost φ (i.e. developer demand is inelastic, ε H = +∞)
and that developers for the same platform compete as in example 2 (i.e. V (n) = An β , Proof See appendix.¥ Thus, proposition 6 confirms that there is a sense in which platform competition may be undesirable because it prevents the competing platforms from sufficiently internalizing positive indirect network effects, so that they do not have enough incentives to induce product variety. A monopoly platform can sometimes be more efficient, even though it creates more deadweight loss. Although here we have focused on the simplest case, in which both the competing platforms and a monopoly platform cover the user market entirely, it should be clear that this insight is valid in more general settings, with partial coverage of the user market and more than two platforms.
Conclusion
There is a widely held view among policy makers and economists that open platforms and competition among platforms are intrinsically more desirable for social efficiency than etc.), which should inform both policy-makers and business practitioners.
so that the inequality above is equivalent to:
or, using (2.5):
Noting that
, this is finally equivalent to (2.12).
Similarly, (n so , θ m so ) is a global maximum for W if and only if the Hessian matrix of W (n, θ m ) evaluated at this point is semi-definite negative. We have:
< 1 − V 0 (n so ) V 00 (n so ) n so ε H or:
which is in turn equivalent to (2.12) .
ii) The necessary and sufficient conditions for stability are: We assume that the parameters A, B and C are such that both solutions are interior, so that in order to prove q m p < q m so it is sufficient to prove that E 0 (q m ) > 0 for all q m ∈ [q L , q H ] and the derivatives of the two expressions above are both negative. We have:
so that E 0 (q m ) > 0 is equivalent to:
which is true since βq L > 2q H .
The second derivative of total social welfare with respect to q m is:
and is clearly negative. Therefore, we are done if we show that E 00 (q m ) > 0. We have:
V 00 (Q) = β + 2, the condition E 00 (q m ) > 0 is equivalent to: The expression of the social welfare gain from having a single platform rather than two becomes:
A (1 − β) n On the other hand we need to make sure that in the symmetric equilibrium with two competing platforms they make non-negative profits and all users do indeed singlehome, which will yield a lower bound on t. We have: 
Finally, we need to verify that t L ≤ t H , which is equivalent to:
nd this inequality holds for all β ≥ 0.¥
